Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis

Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis

Literal Meaning

The operation of law is firmer and more powerful than the will of man.

Explanation & Origin

Origin- Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam disposition hominis is Latin term used in legal term. It means the operation law is firmer and more powerful than the will of a man.

Explanation- The term means that the way the law operates is more firm and more powerful than any man or body of government. Law should always be powerful because they are the rules and regulation of the country and without them there wouldn’t be peace.


The law is firm when it comes to hideous crimes.

Case Reference

In the case of  Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs F.N. Rana And Others[1]to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and to the exercise of such rights, authority and Jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreements: Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-cl. (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in the Constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws. Prima facie, the executive power of the Union extends to all matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws and in respect of matters to which the power of the Parliament extends. It was claimed that by the use of the expression “save as expressly provided in the Constitution” it was intended that unless a provision in the Constitution expressly enacts that the executive power of’ the Union shall, within the meaning of Art. 73(1) proviso, extend to a matter in respect of which the Legislature of a State has also power to makelaws, that provision cannot exclude the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1). But the expression ” save as expressly provided in the Constitution” is not susceptible of that limited interpretation. A provision in the Constitution conferring authority upon the Union to exercise its powers in matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws, operates not- withstanding the limitation enacted by the proviso. Article 298, which, inter alia, extends the power of the Union to the “acquisition” of property, is one such provision. Our attention has not been invited to any provision which makes an enactment of the nature suggested by counsel for the appellant excluding the operation of the proviso to Art. 73(1). Articles 353, 360(3), 339(2), 256 and 257 on which reliance was placed, merely enact provisions in the Constitution for giving directions to the State Governments in respect of certain specified matters or purposes. The form in which these provisions are couched do not expressly provide that within the field of their operation Art. 73(1) proviso will not apply. The language used, on the other hand, supports the view that power is conferred upon the Union to do certain things falling within the limits of the executive power, even though normally the power in respect of that matter may be exercised by the State Legislature by virtue of the legislative entry to which it relates. It is therefore open to the President, subject to the proviso to cl. (1) of Art. 73, with the consent of the State Government, to entrust executive power of the Union relating to acquisition of land either to the State or any officers of the State.

In the case of Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta vs W. R. Nathu And Others [2] that the Forward Markets Commission could not, on a proper construction of the Act, be validly vested with the power with which it was clothed by the amended bye- law, and (b) that it was beyond the power of the Association to have conferred the power which it purported to do under the amended bye-law 52AA. Put in other words, the objections were that the Forward Markets Commission could not, having regard to the terms of the statute under which it was created, be a proper recipient of thepower ‘with which it was vested by the bye-law and secondly that the Association was in lawincapable of conferring that power on the Forward Markets Commission or on any other body. We shall first take up for consideration the argument that the Forward Markets Commission was in lawincapable of being the recipient of the power conferred by the bye-law under which it was empoweredto issue the impugned notification. For this purpose it is necessary to examine in detail the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 (b) defines ‘Commission’ as meaning “The Forward Markets Commission” established under s. 3Section 3.

In the case of Ramesh Birch & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors[3] It will be noticed that the powers conferred by this section upon the Central Government are far in excess of those conferred by the other two legislative provisions, at least in accordance with the interpretation which I have attempted to put upon them. As has been stated already, it is quite an intelligible policy that so long as a proper legislative machinery is not set up in a particular area. the Parliament might empower an executive authority to introduce laws validly passed by a competent legislature and actually in force in other parts of the country to such area, with such modifications and restrictions as the authority thinks proper, the modifications being limited to local adjustments or changes of a minor character. But this presupposes that there is no existing law on that particular subject actually in force in that territory. If any such law exists and power is given to repeal or abrogate such laws either in whole in part and substitute in place of the same other laws which are in force in other areas, it would certainly amount to an unwar- rantable delegation of legislative powers. To repeal or abrogate an existing law is the exercise of an essential legislative power, and the policy behind such acts must be the policy of the legislature itself. If the legislature invests the executive with the power to determine as to which of the laws in force in a particular territory are useful or proper and if it is given to that authority to replace any of them by laws brought from other provinces with such modification as it thinks proper, that would be to invest the executive with the determination of the entire legislative policy and not merely of carrying out a policy which the legislature has already laid down. Thus the power of extension, which is contemplated by section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act, in- cludes the power of introducing laws which may be in actual conflict with the laws validly established and already in operation in that territory. This shows how the practice, which was adopted during the early British period as an expedient and possibly harmless measure with the object of providing laws for a newly acquired territory or backward area till it grew up into a full-fledged administrative and political unit, is being resorted to in later times for no other purpose than that of vesting almost unrestricted legislative powers with regard to certain areas in the executive government. The last portion of section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act is, therefore, ultra vires the power of the Parliament as being a delegation of essential legislative powers in favour of a body not competent to exercise it and to that extent the legislation must be held to be void. This portion is however severable; and so the entire section need not be declared invalid.

Edited by Vigneshwar Ramasubramania

Approved & Published – Sakshi Raje


[1] 1964 AIR 648

[2] 1963 AIR 274

[3] 1990 AIR 560

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