CITATION : (2025) 7 SCR 1879
On 31st July, 2025
Supreme Court of India
Bench: BR Gavai , A.G. Masih
Petitioner: Padi Kaushik Reddy Kuna Pandu Vivekanand (BRS MLAs) and Alleti Maheshwar Reddy (BJP MLA) along with others. .
Respondent: The State of Telangana, Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly, the allegedly defected MLAs and others.
Background of the case:
After the most recent election held in Telangana on 30 November 2023, 10 MLAs who were first elected to Assembly as members of Bharat Rashtriya Samiti(BRS), later defected to the ruling Congress party, in batches between March and April 2024. The Speaker had been delaying decisions on multiple petitions filed by members of Bharat Rashtriya Samiti(BRS). In a petition by members of BRS, a single judge had granted four weeks to the Speaker to decide pending disqualification matters against the 10 members. A Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order. The members, then, challenged the Division Bench order to the Supreme court, arguing that the 10 members had violated Anti-defection laws under Tenth schedule.
- Issues Involved:
- (i) Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the Single Judge’s order, which had merely directed the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing within four weeks.
- (ii) Whether courts, the High Court under Articles 226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 136, have the jurisdiction to issue directions to the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a time-bound period.
(iii) Whether the Speaker’s protracted inaction amounted to a failure to exercise jurisdiction conferred under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule.
- Rules/ Legal Provisions Applied:
- Constitutional Provisions
- Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 2(1) – Disqualification on ground of defection.
- Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 6(1) – Speaker/Chairman as the adjudicating authority; finality clause.
- Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 6(2) – Deeming fiction equating disqualification proceedings with proceedings of the House
- Article 122 – Bar on court jurisdiction over proceedings in Parliament on grounds of irregularity of procedure
- Article 212 – Corresponding bar for State Legislatures
- Article 191(2) – Disqualification of members of State Legislatures
- Article 226 – High Court’s writ jurisdiction
- Article 227 – High Court’s superintendence over subordinate courts and tribunals
- Article 136 – Supreme Court’s special leave jurisdiction
2) Rules
- Rules 6(1) and 6(2), Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 – Procedure for filing disqualification petitions
- Rule 7 – Obligation to forward a copy of the disqualification petition to the respondent member and leader of the legislature party
3) Judicial Precedents:
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992 Supp (2) SCC 651):
This case recognised the Speaker/Chairman as a ‘tribunal’ whose decisions are subject to judicial review for jurisdictional errors and introduced the notion that courts should avoid quia timet (anticipatory) injunctions that stall the Speaker’s decision-making.
- Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007) 4 SCC 270:
The Court held that failure of the Speaker to exercise jurisdiction is itself reviewable. The Supreme Court directly disqualified MLAs because Assembly’s term was expiring; demonstrated readiness to intervene where delay defeats the Schedule.
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur LA (2021) 16 SCC 503:
It clarified that “para 110 of Kihoto does not interdict judicial review in aid of a prompt decision”. Set an ‘outer limit of three months’ for the Speaker’s decision in normal circumstances.
- Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2024) 2 SCC 719:
The Court reaffirmed that the Speaker is “appropriate constitutional authority” but must decide within a reasonable period and it did not invalidate Keisham; thus left scope for timelines.
- Reasoning of the Court:
- On the Speaker’s status as Tribunal:
- The court reiterated the consistent position from Kihoto Hollohan to Subhash Desai: when acting under Paragraph 6(1), the Speaker functions as a Tribunal exercising judicial power, amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and to the Supreme Court under Article 136. The Speaker’s decisions in that capacity do not enjoy the immunity under Articles 122 or 212.
- That the Speaker’s inaction amounts to failure itself:
- Drawing on Rajendra Singh Rana, the Court held that the Speaker’s 7-month silence and issuance of notice only after the Supreme Court was seized “cannot by any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner”. Such inertia violates the very purpose of entrusting the Speaker with adjudicatory power.
- On the quia timet bar:
- Drawing on Keisham Meghachandra Singh and the underlying logic of Kihoto Hollohan, the court held that what the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan intended to prohibit by the quia timet bar was injunctions that would prevent or obstruct the Speaker from making a decision, not judicial intervention that promotes a prompt decision. Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan, read together, protect the Speaker’s exclusive jurisdiction so that nothing should impede the exercise of that jurisdiction, not so that it can be indefinitely suspended. A direction to decide expeditiously aids, not obstructs, the constitutional scheme.
- On whether the Court should decide disqualification itself:
- The court declined to replicate the exceptional step taken in Rajendra Singh Rana, where the Constitution Bench itself disqualified the MLAs because the Assembly term was about to expire. All Constitution Bench judgments consistently establish the Speaker as the first-instance authority. There were no exceptional circumstances unlike Rajendra Singh Rana that warranted bypassing the Speaker entirely.
- Conclusion/Judgement:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and passed the following directions:
i) The Division Bench’s judgment dated 22 November 2024 was quashed and set aside.
ii) The Single Judge’s order dated 9 September 2024 was restored in spirit.
iii) The Speaker was directed to conclude the disqualification proceedings against all 10 MLAs as expeditiously as possible and in any case within three months from the date of the judgment (31 July 2025).
iv) The Speaker was directed not to permit any of the MLAs to protract proceedings, and any such attempt would entitle the Speaker to draw an adverse inference against the delaying MLA.
- Case Analysis:
The judgment exposes a deeper design flaw in the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker, who typically belongs to the ruling party, has little political incentive to act swiftly against defectors who now support that very party. As the judgment observed, the operation succeeded while the patient died: Speakers have learned to honour the letter of the law while frustrating its purpose.
Judicial directions can only go so far. A motivated Speaker retains enough procedural discretion through adjournments, deferred hearings, or inaction to render even a three-month deadline practically toothless. The facts of this case are telling: the Speaker issued disqualification notices only after the Supreme Court intervened. Left to themselves, the proceedings may never have moved at all.
The court was candid that replacing the Speaker with an independent tribunal is a question for Parliament, not the judiciary. The judgment is constitutionally sound and, on its own terms, necessary. But it addresses a symptom. Until Parliament resolves the structural conflict of interest at the heart of the Tenth Schedule, the Supreme Court will find itself repeatedly filling an institutional vacuum that only legislative reform can close.
THIS ARTICLE IS WRITTEN BY ANANYA YADAV FROM FACULTY OF LAW, BHU
