In this case, a doctor was accused of medical negligence for allegedly not attending a woman after performing cesarean operation, which resulted in her death. She was discharged by the Trial Court by allowing her application. The Appellate Court reversed this order of the Trial Court. it must be established that there was negligence or incompetence on the doctor’s part which went beyond a mere question of compensation on the basis of civil liability. Criminal liability would arise only if the doctor did something in disregard of the life and safety of the patient. Certain directions have also been given in the case.
Negligence, in simple terms, is the failure to take due care and caution. It is a breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable person – guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs – should have done. It may also be doing something, which a prudent and reasonable person would not have done.
Facts of the case
The prosecution story is that Santosh Rani (deceased) was admitted to the Agnihotri Hospital run by the appellants herein. Santosh Rani was expecting a child and she was advised caesarian operation. Such operation was conducted at about and a male child was born. After the birth of the child the doctors felt that blood was required to be given to Santosh Rani. Thereafter, her husband Nand Lal and brother Bhajan Lal offered to give blood and this blood was taken and transfused to Santosh Rani, the next morning Santosh Rani expired. Thereafter, Mulkh Raj, brother of the husband of the deceased filed an FIR with the police. It is important to note that in the FIR it is stated that in the hospital the blood of Nand Lal and Bhajan Lal was taken by the dispenser and Dr. Agnihotri of the hospital. It is further stated that these two persons tested the blood and transfused it to Santosh Rani and oxygen was also administered. The main allegation against the appellants in the case is that they did not attend to Santosh Rani. The Trial Court on the application of the accused discharged them relying upon the judgment of this Court in Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1 case. The Additional Sessions Judge set aside the order of discharge and the order of Additional Sessions Judge in revision has been upheld. In Jacob Mathew’s Case this Court clearly held that in criminal law medical professionals are placed on a pedestal different from ordinary mortals. It was further held that to prosecute the medical professionals for negligence under criminal law, something more than mere negligence had to be proved. Medical professionals deal with patients and they are expected to take the best decisions in the circumstances of the case.
In the present case the appellants failed to obtain any opinion of an independent doctor. The postmortem report does not show that the death of Santosh Rani had occurred due to the transfusion of blood. The only negligence that could be attributed to the accused is that they carried out the blood transfusion in violation of some instructions issued by the Chief Medical Officer that blood should be obtained from a licensed blood bank and that no direct blood transfusion from the donor to the patient should be done.
The essentials components of Criminal Neglience
The essential components of negligence are: ‘duty’, ‘breach’ and ‘resulting damage’. These definitions are rather relative and can change with the circumstances. When trying to drag a person away from the clutches of an attacking animal, one cannot ask whether this would cause damage to the person’s limbs. Doctors can also be faced with similar contingencies. On finding an accident victim in a dangerous condition, a doctor may have to attempt a crude form of emergency surgery to try and save the person’s life. No negligence is involved in such cases. Under the civil law, victims of negligence can get relief in the form of compensation from a civil court or the consumer forum. Here, the applicant only needs to prove that an act took place that was wanting in due care and caution, and the victim consequently suffered damage. There is a difference between civil and criminal negligence. However, in certain circumstances, the same negligent act may also be seen as criminal if it constitutes an offence under any law of the land.
The main question in the above case was whether different standards could be applied to professionals (doctors) alone, placing them on a higher pedestal for finding criminal liability for their acts or omissions. The Court noted that as citizens become increasingly conscious of their rights, they are filing more cases against doctors in the civil courts, as also under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, alleging ‘deficiency in service’. Furthermore, doctors are being prosecuted under Section 304A of the IPC (causing death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act which does not amount to culpable homicide) which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. They are also being prosecuted under Section 336 (rash or negligent act endangering human life), Section 337 (causing hurt to any person by doing any rash or negligent act as would endanger human life) or Section 338 of the IPC (causing grievous hurt to any person by doing any rash or negligent act so as to endanger human life). The Court observed that allegations of rashness or negligence are often raised against doctors by persons without adequate medical knowledge, to extract unjust compensation.
Since the medical profession renders a noble service, it must be shielded from frivolous or unjust prosecutions. With this perspective in mind the Court went into the question as to what is actionable negligence in the case of professionals. The law now laid down is as follows:
1. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, even fatal, will not constitute culpable medical negligence. If the doctor had followed a practice acceptable to the medical profession at the relevant time, he or she cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available, or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice.
2. Professionals may certainly be held liable for negligence if they were not possessed of the requisite skill which they claimed, or if they did not exercise, with reasonable competence, the skill which they did possess.
3. The word ‘gross’ has not been used in Section 304A of IPC. However, as far as professionals are concerned, it is to be read into it so as to insist on proof of gross negligence for a finding of guilty.
4. The maxim Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence. It might operate in the domain of civil law; but that by itself cannot be pressed into service for determining the liability for negligence within the domain of criminal law. It has only a limited application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence.
5. Statutory Rules or executive instructions incorporating definite guidelines governing the prosecution of doctors need to be framed and issued by the State and Central governments in consultation with the Medical Council of India (MCI). Until this is done, private complaints must be accompanied by the credible opinion of another competent doctor supporting the charge of rashness or negligence. In the case of police prosecutions, such an opinion should preferably from a doctor in government service.
Order of the Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 770 OF 2009
Anjana Agnihotri & Anr. …..Appellant(s)
Vs.
The State of Haryana & Anr. ….Respondent(s)
Order
This Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.04.2008 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby the High Court upheld the order of Additional Sessions Judge dated 24.09.2004 by which the order dated 30.11.2000 of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali discharging the appellants for having committed offences under Section 304A Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 18- C/27-B of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, was set aside.
In the present case the appellants failed to obtain any opinion of an independent doctor. The postmortem report does not show that the death of Santosh Rani had occurred due to the transfusion of blood. The only negligence that could be attributed to the accused is that they carried out the blood transfusion in violation of some instructions issued by the Chief Medical Officer that blood should be obtained from a licensed blood bank and that no direct blood transfusion from the donor to the patient should be done. In our opinion even if this is true the negligence is not such as to fall within the ambit of Jacob Mathew’s case (supra). In view of the above, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the trial court and discharge the appellants.
The Appeal is accordingly allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand(s) disposed of.
……………….J. (DEEPAK GUPTA)
………………..J. (HEMANT GUPTA)
New Delhi; 6th February, 2020.
Edited by Pragash Boopal
Approved & Published – Sakshi Raje
